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Deep State. Visual Socio-Political
Communication in the Television
Series and Serials of the Turkish
Television Channel Samanyolu
Petra de Bruijn
1 The 11th episode of the Turkish serial1 Ötesiz İnsanlar ([The People Beyond], 2013-2015)2,
directed by Başak Soysal shows an officer in the Turkish army, around 1997, on his way to
the classy engagement party of the daughter of a general and the son of a colonel. The
officer is religious and his wife covers her hair. The army dress code in this era requires
his wife to appear unveiled at the engagement party. The wife leaves home unveiled,
however, on the road to the party the officer regrets that he made his wife unveil. He
stops the car in Balat, a conservative quarter of Istanbul, in order to buy a scarf in one of
the shops. However, the shops are closed and in despair he rings the bell at all the houses
in  the  neighbourhood.  He  asks  Allah  to  help  him and suddenly  scarfs  fall  from the
windows like manna from heaven (Plate 1 below).
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Plate 1: Screenshot Ötesiz İnsanlar, episode 11, 44,05 min.
2 He returns to the car and promises his wife that he will never ask her again to unveil. The
seculars have to respect them for what they are. The headscarf issue was important in
Turkish politics for several decades, from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. Through images
and content as mentioned above, the Turkish television channel Samanyolu (Milky Way)
communicated  a  socio-political  message.  Samanyolu  was  an  international  religiously
orientated  television  channel  with  its  headquarters  in  Turkey;  owned  by  the  Gülen 
Movement3,  related to the Islamic scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen. The channel 
started broadcasting on 13 January 1993 and was closed directly after the failed military
coup of 15 July 2016.
3 Samanyolu television  drama  involved  social  issues  from  the  perspective  of  Islamic
religiosity, such as being honest, law abiding, peace loving, pious and caring for your
family and neighbours. In addition, the channel included political issues in their shows,
such as the Kurdish question, the headscarf issue, the 1997 military intervention and the
controversy,  starting  in  2013,  between  the  Adalet  ve  Kalkınma  Partisi (Justice and
Development Party, AKP) and the Gülen Movement. By touching upon sensitive Turkish
social and political issues, Samanyolu was one of the few television channels to defy the
self-censorship many Turkish media have inflicted upon themselves, especially since 2007
4. This article aims to elaborate on how Samanyolu disseminated socio-political content
through  its  television  series  and  serials,  asking  questions  especially  about  Turkish
political  reality  and  religiosity.  The  discussion  will  touch  upon  the  politicization  of
Turkish television drama in general and the position of Samanyolu in Turkish television.
The focus will then be narrowed down to Samanyolu television dramas, particularly those
series and serials of this channel in which socio-political themes appear: Şubat Soğuğu ([
February Cold], 2004-2006), Tek Türkiye ([One Turkey], 2007-2010), Şefkat Tepe ([Compassion
Peak], 2010-2014) and Ötesiz İnsanlar ([The People Beyond], 2013-2015). Only a selection of
the Samanyolu shows with socio-political  content will  be discussed here,  although in
many others,  references to political  and historical  events  in Turkey were made.  The
serials included in this analysis form a representative case study of the manner in which
socio-political content was disseminated. 
 
Deep State. Visual Socio-Political Communication in the Television Series and...
TV/Series, 13 | 2018
2
Politicization of Turkish television
4 Television drama has been used as a vehicle for the dissemination of political content in
Turkey since the early 2000s, as Kumru Berfin Emre Çetin argues. The use of television
drama as a vehicle for social  and political  content is  not a new phenomenon;  it  has
occurred amongst others in Brazil, Egypt and China5. In this respect, television drama is
nothing  else  but  a  recent  cultural  product  with  the  potential  of  influencing  public
opinion; as theatre, literature and film did before.
5 According to Çetin, this politicization was provoked by a number of circumstances. On
the one hand, the late 1990s saw a large privatization of Turkish television channels; this
was followed by a period of about 15 years, until 2006 in which relative freedom existed
for  these  channels  to  determine  the  content  of  their  programmes6.  Turkish  private
television grew rapidly and at the same time Turkish society became more politicized,
with a strong polarization between the secular and the religious. The combination of the
relative freedom to determine the content of television and the increasing gap between
societal factions in Turkish society brought about a politicization of Turkish television
series and serials. After 2006, the relative freedom for private broadcasters changed. New
regulations were implemented and, especially after 2010 with the consolidation of the
AKP government, restrictions on the freedom of expression imposed on the media by the
increasingly  authoritarian  mode  of  government,  multiplied  drastically7.  The  Turkish
mediascape  became  more  and  more  politicized  and  polarized.  Media  supporting  the
government did propaganda for the ruling party; those who wanted to tell a different tale
were submitted to censorship and applied self-censorship. Çetin discerns two trends in
the politicization of Turkish television drama: the dissemination of political messages
through television serials and the use of television drama as “a battleground for groups
expressing a variety of political concerns8”. 
 
Position of Samanyolu
6 Samanyolu, on which this research will concentrate, started broadcasting in 1993. It was
one of the smaller national channels, with in 2010 a market share of 2%9. According to a
study conducted in  2009 by  the  Radyo  ve  Televizyon  Üst  Kurulu (Radio  and Television
Supreme Council, RTÜK) Samanyolu ranged fifth in the list of most popular television
channels with around 10% of the votes10. Samanyolu was owned by Feza Gazetecilik A.Ş.11; a
media  conglomerate  combining  newspapers  in  several  countries,  a  news  agency,  a
publishing house and a television channel. Feza Publications was closely associated with
the Gülen Movement. After the failed military intervention in July 2016 all media outlets
of the Gülen Movement in Turkey were closed, including Samanyolu12. Samanyolu could
be described as a generic channel aiming at an Islamic orientated audience.
7 Drama forms an important component of the television offer in Turkey; economically13
and in terms of their presence on the Turkish mainstream channels14. Turkish television
series and serials have qualitatively and quantitatively improved during the last decades
to a point that they became an important export product15; in 2014 Turkey reached the
level of the second world wide exporter of television drama16. Samanyolu was comparable
to the other mainstream channels: 61% of its broadcasting was dedicated to television
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series  and  serials17.  In  November  2015  Samanyolu  was  removed  from  the  Turkish
television broadcasting satellite Türksat18. By this removal the advertising revenues were
cut  off,  and the  channel  could  no longer  afford the production and broadcasting  of
television series and serials. After the failed military coup in July 2016 Samanyolu was
closed altogether.
8 In the 1990s and 2000s Samanyolu caused a hype with the concept of fantasy series and
serials. Ahu Yiğit describes these shows as: 
These fantasy serials adopt magical plots such as time travel, angels disguised as
ordinary people, and appearing or disappearing objects and people. Several serials
are set in the afterlife, from which the main character looks back on his or her life
on earth19.
9 The first serial with fantasy content was Sırlar Dünyası  ([World of Mysteries], 1996-2007,
[first called Sırlar Kapısı, The Gate of Mysteries]). Other channels copied the concept, which
was very popular for some time, but after a few years these productions were cancelled20.
Samanyolu continued to produce fantasy serials and to broadcast reruns. However, in
2015, other concepts, not based on fantasy, dominated the spectre. 
10 Yiğit’s claim that Samanyolu broadcasted only fantasy serials was not correct21.  From
2004 onwards Samanyolu broadened its repertoire with other concepts. Since that time,
Samanyolu produced,  besides  fantasy,  serials  of  different  genres,  for  instance  police
serials such as: Kollama ([Being Watched], 2008-2011) and Ekip 1-Nizama Adanmış Ruhlar ([
Squadron  1  –  Souls  Dedicated  to Order],  2012-2015);  serials  about  family  life  and moral
dilemmas such as, İki Dünya Arasında ([Between Two Worlds], 2012-2015) and Küçük Gelin ([
Young  Bride],  2013);  and  action  serials,  such  as  Tek  Türkiye (2007-2010),  Şefkat  Tepe
(2010-2014) and its successor Sungurlar ([Falcon’s], 2014-2015). 
11 Recurring themes in Samanyolu’s dramas are anti-Islam politics such as the 28 February
1997 military intervention and the head scarf issue, the importance of education, the
advocacy  of  a  modern,  preferably  pious,  life  style,  international conspiracy  theories
related  to  Free  Masonry  and  the  corruption  and  terror  conducted  by  state  related
underground organizations, the PKK and Syrian or Iraqi Kurdish organizations. Socio-
political messages may be found in all of Samanyolu’s shows. However, the emphasis of
these themes in the most prominent examples shifts and the degree to which and the
manner in which socio-political content was included changed over time.
 
Şubat Soğuğu ([February Cold], 2004-2006)
12 The first serial with an openly political content that Samanyolu broadcasted was Şubat
Soğuğu.  It dealt with a corrupt criminal group that carried out operations for a “deep
state”  organization.  Mehtap  Söyler  and  Ryan  Gingeras,  amongst  others,  prove  that
Turkey has a history of various kinds of underground forces, called derin devlet (deep
state). These organizations, have existed since the time of the Ottoman Empire and have
served both Ottoman and Republican Turkish regimes to consolidate their power and in
Republican Turkey’s case to establish authoritarian regimes. After 1945, in cooperation
with the CIA, an Özel Harp Dairesi (Special Warfare Department) was established, later to
be  continued under  other  names,  like  specially  in  the  Kurdish  regions  the  Jandarma
İstihbarat  ve  Terörle  Mücadele (Gendarmerie  Intelligence and Anti-terror  Organization).
Since  the  70s  and  80s  these  secret  organizations  have  maintained  strong  ties  with
organized crime, mainly drug trafficking and the mafia and ultra-nationalist extreme
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right  political  parties  with  violent  youth  organisations  such  as  the  Bozkurtlar (Grey
Wolves).  These  deep  state  organisations  were  responsible  for  most  of  the  numerous
unaccounted for killings during the politically tumultuous years between 1960 and 198022.
13 The existence of deep state organisations has inspired many producers of Turkish films
and television drama; amongst others Kurlar Vadisi Pusu ([Valley of the Wolves, Ambush], 
2007-2016) the television serial and the movie Kurtlar Vadisi Gladio ([Valley of the Wolves,
Gladio], 2009)23. All mainstream television channels in Turkey, including Samanyolu, have
elaborated on this theme. A producer has numerous opportunities for many action scenes
with this theme, which, in addition, appeals to the nationalistic feelings of many Turks.
Moreover,  as  Göçek  states,  many  people  still  believe  that  Turkish  sovereignty  is
undermined  by  foreign  powers  in combination  with  deep  state  related  criminal
organisations24.  Şubat  Soğuğu was  the  first  Samanyolu  serial  in  which  a  deep  state
organisation was depicted. As will be shown below, this theme reoccurred in various ways
and even more strongly in later serials.
14 The name of the serial, Şubat Soğuğu, refers to what is called the 28 February military
intervention.  In  1997  and  1998  the  Turkish  military  intervened  in  politics  by
overthrowing the coalition government of  the Islamic Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)  of
Necmettin Erbakan, by closing down the party and by banning Erbakan from politics. This
intervention was accompanied by the dismissal of a great number of military personnel
and measures were taken against manifestations of Islam in public life. The military and
other  secularist  politicians  were  afraid  of  the  increasing  power  of  political  Islam in
Turkey25. These events had a deep impact on religious movements, not only on the Milli
Görüş (National Vision) around Necmettin Erbakan and its successor the AKP of Recep
Tayyıp Erdoğan; they affected the Gülen Movement as well. For the Gülen Movement,
which tried to provide Islam with a modernist worldview, this intervention was a trauma,
as its depiction in the serials shows.
15 One of the main characters in Şubat Soğuğu is Tahir Mutlu, a writer and history teacher. In
the period following the 28 February intervention, he lived in exile out of fear of being
persecuted for the Islamic content of his writings and teachings. In 2004, when the action
of the show takes place, he returns to Turkey, because of a more liberal climate. At that
time the AKP had won the elections (2002), gaining a majority in Parliament. With this
new regime, came the end of persecution of Islamic conservatives in the army and the
state apparatus, following the 28 February military intervention26.
16 The character of Tahir Mutlu in the serial is the proto-type of a righteous follower of
Fethullah Gülen. Just as Mutlu, Gülen had been prosecuted many times by the secular
regimes and the military for his preaching and his educational activities. He was accused
of encouraging his followers to infiltrate the military and the judiciary in order to take
over the state. After the 28 February intervention, in 1998, he retreated to the United
States27. The way Mutlu is depicted as a peace-loving, humble, religious preacher reminds
one very much of Fethullah Gülen. Although Mutlu is not Gülen, by linking him to the
spiritual leader of the Gülen Movement, the content of the serial takes on a second -
political  -  meaning showing the struggle of  the Gülen Movement against  the secular
forces  in  the  Turkish  regime  (mainly  the  army)  and  the  deep  state  organisations
supporting it.
17 Şubat Soğuğu was inspired by the concept of the immensely popular serial Kurtlar Vadisi ([
Valley of  the Wolves],  2003-2005).  This serial was one of the longest running and most
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popular on Turkish television for more than a decade. It was the first serial in which
political  content  was  introduced.  It  started in  2003 and from 2007 until  2016 it  was
broadcasted under the name Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu [Valley of the Wolves Ambush]. The serial
concentrated on a secret police squadron that fights the mafia, a corrupt conglomerate of
powerful businessmen and an international free masonic organization aiming at a new
world order infiltrating Turkey (Tapınakçılar, Knights Templar.) From the start, the serial
incorporated  elements  from reality  in  its  episodes  and  its  films.  Scenes  referred  to
political  events,  sometimes  commented  upon,  sometimes  acted  out,  sometimes  real
politicians participated in the serial. Themes that were dealt with were amongst others,
the admission of Turkey to the European Union, the Cyprus question and the Kurdish
question28. Just as in Kurtlar Vadisi, Samanyolu included politics in its television dramas in
various ways: political events were referred to, commented upon and imitated. 
 
Tek Türkiye ([One Turkey], 2007-2011)
18 Tek Türkiye combined the theme of deep state violence with that of the terror of the PKK
and the importance of education. The serial was produced by Salih Akan, the directors
were Nacı Çelik Berksoy and Gürsel Ateş and the screenplay was written by Ali Kara and
Samim Utku. The serial related the story of Tarık, a medical doctor, who visits an old
friend in a small village in Hakkâri, the southeastern Kurdish region of Turkey. His friend
is involved in smuggling medicines to the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK). When Tarık
arrives in the village his friend had already left. Tarık decides to stay in the village, which
is poverty struck and suffers hard from the terror inflicted upon it by the PKK. It  is
located in a remote area, where the Turkish army and gendarmerie are absent. It is a
Kurdish village of, in principle, peace loving, traditionally living farmers and landowners.
The  members  of  the  community  are  heavily  divided  between  pro-  and  contra-  PKK
members. The PKK expects that they provide food, money and that their children join the
organisation. New partisans are recruited by indoctrination and by force when needed.
19 During the first two seasons, emphasis lay on the backward position of the village. There
is no school, and when Zeynep, the daughter of the local landowner, trained as a teacher,
makes it  her life’s  work to open up a school  for  the local  children,  she is  met with
resistance from,  on the one hand,  the villagers  because they do not  understand the
importance of education. The PKK, on the other hand, obstructs the establishment of the
school out of fear that the villagers will no longer cooperate when they are educated. In
reality the PKK had launched a campaign against village schoolteachers; many were killed
29. Tarık teaches them hygiene and the necessity of a good working public health system.
In addition, Tarık, with help from the imam and Zeynep, fights the conservative customs
of the local people, such as blood feuds, child marriages and emphasis on the protection
of the honour of women30. 
20 In the last two seasons the depiction of the struggle against the PKK is foregrounded.
There is a time lapse of about ten years. Tarık has married the nurse from the village,
their son is born and he has become kaymakam (governor of a provincial district). The size
of  the  struggle  against  the  PKK  has  magnified.  Already  in  the  first  seasons  it  was
suggested that  the PKK is  not  the only force controlling terror.  References to forces
within the Turkish government and foreign powers become more and more important
during  the  series.  It  is  implied  that  there  are  national  and  international  (English/
American  and  Russian)  intelligence  forces  and  organisations  with  special  mandates
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involved in the Kurdish issue. It is in their interest that the struggle in the southeastern
regions continues; they work for Armenian and Kurdish Communist lobbies who want to
create an independent Armenian and Kurdish state. 
21 These international forces want to restore the map drawn at the end of the First World
War at the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). This treaty reduced the Ottoman Empire to a rump
state consisting only of the northern half of Anatolia. The rest of Anatolia was divided
into Greek,  Italian,  English and French zones of  influence.  An independent Armenian
state was supposed to arise in the eastern provinces and Kurdistan was to be a part of the
Empire with autonomy31. As history proves, these plans never materialized, but a distrust
against foreign powers with respect to their support of Armenian and Kurdish claims,
called  the  “Sèvres  syndrome”  by  Göçek,  has  remained  vivid  in  Turkey  until  today;
Turkey’s national security is always at stake, threatened by internal (Armenians/Kurds
and other minorities) and external western forces32. In the series Tarık finds the original
documents of this partition, signed by all the parties. All enemy parties, the Kurds, the
Armenians, the Russians and the US want to use these original documents of the Sèvres
Treaty for their own benefit and that is one of the reasons why all the parties are after
Tarık.
22 In addition this theme refers to the infiltration of Hizbullah in the southeast of Turkey in
the  1980s.  Hüseyin  Velioğlu  established  this  organisation,  inspired  by  the  Iranian
revolution of 1979 and the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt. Hizbullah acted against the PKK
and its Batman branch worked together with state security organisations against the PKK.
From 1993 onwards, Turkish politics aimed at the dissolution of Hizbullah, but all efforts
were frustrated by the state security organisations.  In 2000,  when Hizbullah was not
needed anymore against the PKK, the organisation was dismantled33.
23 During the last seasons, Tarık had to deal mainly with the PKK and a deep state team of
special  forces  that  enact  possibly  even  more  violent  and  cruel  crimes  towards  the
population than the PKK. In Tek Türkiye the PKK is represented as an organisation with a
strategy of remorseless cruelty against the civilian population and their own people who
refuse to  execute their  extreme orders.  However,  in  the end the lower level  of  PKK
commanders all turn out to have their reasons for becoming so cruel. Some of them had
been victims of PKK violence as well; or they were told that their families had been shot
by the Turkish army, but it was the PKK who did it. Others were persuaded to join the
PKK in their youth with false prospects and regret their choice by now. They, however,
cannot return to their homes because, either, they fear being killed by the PKK or they
face long periods of  imprisonment when they surrender.  One of  the main characters
Şivan, was the commander of the PKK unit that terrorised the village in the first two
seasons. At the end of the second season he suddenly realises that the PKK is corrupt and
that the PKK killed his son. This transforms him into a completely different personality.
He regains his lost faith in Allah and after working for the local populace as atonement,
he becomes a Robin Hood like character that rescues people from a hiding place in the
mountains and in the last season he joins Tarık’s resistance group.
24 Tarık is not able to fight the PKK because of his official function as kaymakam. Deep state
infiltrators obstruct all action taken to appease the region. In the end, they succeed in
getting Tarık arrested.  Tarık escapes to the mountains and forms his  own resistance
group, called Son Karakol (the Last Guard Post). This is a reference to a secret organisation
founded by the unionist leaders at the end of World War I to protect members of the
Turkish government against the revenge of the Allied Forces and Christian minorities and
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to smuggle people and arms to Anatolia. This organisation is considered to be the start of
the resistance movement in Anatolia that led ultimately to the foundation of the Republic
of Turkey (1923).  It  was an underground organisation related to the İttihat ve Terakki
Cemiyeti  (Committee  of  Union  and  Progress,  better  known  as  the  Young  Turks)  and
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk34 who worked together with this organisation only for a short
time. Later Atatürk established his own underground organisation35. 
25 In Tek Türkiye, Tarık, the good guy, stands for the civilized Turkish nation, where justice is
implied  and  where  there  is  space  for  Turks  as  well  as  minorities  to  live  peacefully
together. The reference here to Karakol,  the first resistance movement of the Turkish
Republic, implies, on the one hand, that Tarık and his friends are rescuing Turkey from
the PKK and foreign intervention, like the heroes of the “Struggle for Independence”. On
the other hand, they represent “the other” resistance, distinct from the secular Kemalist
state resistance.
26 The serial ends with the dismantling of the deep state organisation, and a reconciliation
of all local parties. A school will be build and it is suggested that when the people in
southeast Anatolia get educated, justice and peace will remain and the area will prosper.
The concept of schooling is a very important element in the Gülen Movement. It runs
schools, boarding houses, universities and pre-university courses, first only in Turkey,
but later as the movement grew, in many countries ranging from Central Asia, Africa, the
Balkans, the US, Europe to Australia36.
 
Şefkat Tepe ([Compassion Peak], 2010-2014)
27 Tek Türkiye’s successor, Şefkat Tepe was broadcasted for four seasons from 2010-2014. The
serial was produced by Salih Akan, directed by Engin Koç and the screenplay was written
by Samim Utku. During the first two seasons the serial Şefkat Tepe focused on a regular
army unit near a border village Karapınar in the southeastern region of Turkey. It is not
clear whether this is the Syrian or the Iraqi border. In the first episode it is indicated that
the serial takes place in 1997. This was a moment in history when the Turkish army more
or less broke the resistance of the PKK and with the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader
of the PKK, in 1999 an armistice was established37.
28 In the serial a Kurdish PKK cell terrorizes the village. The message of this programme is
strongly Turkish nationalistic, depicting the PKK as mean villains and terrorists and the
army as the good guys. The villagers are depicted as, mostly innocent, victims. The events
dominating the serial are attacks on the village and the kidnapping of people, mostly
women and children for extortion or young girls and boys, who are recruited for the PKK.
As Zürcher states, in the Turkish press of those days, voluntary recruitments were often
presented as kidnappings38. In the serial however very few people voluntarily join the
PKK and many characters at one point repent their terrorist actions and become loyal
anti-PKK fighters. Ali Samim Noyan, the scenarist of the serial, relates in an interview
with Radikal journalist Pınar Öğünç that the show does not want to depict enmity between
Turks and Kurds. The serial focussed more on moral, righteous and human behaviour and
wanted to stress the unity of Turkey39.
29 From  the  third  season  onwards,  a  team  of  special  forces,  the  Sungurlar ([ Falcon’s],
2014-2015), is established and the main character Serdar Mert, commander of the army
unit in the village during the first two seasons, now becomes the commander of this unit.
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This team did not so much fight the PKK anymore, but concentrated on Kurdish and
Islamist  terrorists  in  Syria,  or  sometimes  infiltrated the  Turkish border  region.  This
change can be explained by the political reality in Turkey; from 2012 onwards the peace
process that lasted until the summer of 2015, secretly started by the AKP government in
2009, became visible to the general public40. 
30 Ali  Samim  Noyan,  the  scenarist  of  the  serial,  relates  in  the  interview  with  Radikal
journalist Pınar Öğünç, that the peace process was a central issue in the serial. As Öğünç
comments, it is impossible to deny the fact that 60% of the Turkish population supports
the peace process. “[D]ışardan bir uyarıyla değil” (without a warning form outside), but
independently, the Samanyolu management and the production team decided to change
the story line. Noyan explains that, although the serial was supposed to take place in the
1990s, they wanted to make the serial look real. Since there was no armed struggle in
2013  between  the  PKK  and  the  army  anymore,  the  serial  concentrated  on  foreign
agencies; which according to Noyan “are still around41”. 
31 One of the organisations the Sungurlar fight against is Selam-Tevhid (Peace-Unification) or
by another name Kudüs Ordusu (Jerusalem army)42. This is, in reality, an Iranian orientated
Islamist  terrorist  group that  fights  against  Israel  and its  allies.  It  has  been active in
Turkey since the 1980s and some believe they were involved in the killing of the famous
left-wing journalist Uğur Mumcu in 199343. After 2014 Şefkat Tepe continued under the
title Sungurlar.  At the start of the serial, in a promotion trailer, commander Serdar is
wearing an orange overall, about to be executed by the Islamic State. As indicated in the
scene,  the  action  takes  place  in  the Rojava  area,  the  independent  Kurdish  area  in
Northern Syria44.
 
AKP – Gülen Movement controversy
32 The Gülen Movement, with their emphasis on the importance of education - educating
many  managers,  lawyers  and  economists  -  was  associated  with  the  AKP,  during  its
formative years. Many Hizmet sympathisers found jobs in the judiciary, ministries and
earned  important  positions  in  the  private  sector45.  From  2012  onwards  the  relation
between the AKP and the Gülen Movement became troubled. A public prosecutor wanted
information from Hakan Fidan, chief of the Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence
Agency) about the secret negotiations between a Turkish delegation and the PKK in Oslo.
The AKP accused the Gülen Movement of disturbing the peace process. As a punishment
the  AKP  started  an  initiative  to  close  down  the  Dershane’s,  private,  extra-curricular
institutions  where  high  school  children  could  prepare,  for  example,  the  career
determining central entrance exam for university. In December 2013 a large corruption
scandal,  involving  family  members  of  cabinet  ministers  and  even  the  son  of  Prime
Minister Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan was disclosed. Erdoğan immediately blamed the Gülen 
Movement and foreign powers of  being behind what he called an attempt at  a coup
against his government. Ever since, Erdoğan has taken all possible measures to destroy
the Gülen Movement, which he now considers to be his worst foe46.
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Karar Kurulu ([Decision Board], 2013-2014)
33 The Gülen Movement could be best  described as a religious community with a loose
structure; it is not a political organisation. The movement does not have the power a
government  or  political  party  has  to  implement  judicial  steps  or  any  other  form of
measures against the AKP. Therefore, in case of controversy with the AKP, they used their
television series to explain their side of the story. Between 28 September 2013 and 19
April  2014,  a  kind  of  mini  serial  (28  episodes)  by  the  name  of  Karar  Kurulu was
broadcasted, included within several episodes of Şefkat Tepe (E119-E148). The episodes of
Karar Kurulu were broadcasted as an integral part of the episodes of Şefkat Tepe; always at
the start of the episode. As an independent serial Karar Kurulu existed only on the website
of Küre TV, the on-demand Internet streaming channel of Samanyolu; currently it is not
on display. Its content was not related to the plot of the main show, Şefkat Tepe. In the
episodes of this mini serial, each lasting around 5-10 minutes, we see meetings of a secret
board talking about creating chaos in Turkey. (See Plate 2 below) The board is determined
to wipe out the power of the Gülen Movement, called Cami`a (community) in the series.
The board discusses the measures they have taken in order to destroy the power of the
Cami’a.  For instance, they congratulate themselves on the closure, in fall  2013, of the
Dershane’s (Cram Schools), one of the issues in the controversy between the AKP and the
Gülen Movement.
 
Plate 2: screenshot Karar Kurulu [Decision Board], Şefkat Tepe 2,52 min.47
34 The concept of the Karar Kurulu originated in Tek Türkiye. In this show the Decision Board
was called Karanlık Konsey (Dark Council). The Karanlık Konsey, first appeared in the second
season, (E63), broadcasted on 6 April 2009. The last Karanlık Konsey scene was broadcasted
(E91, as far as I have been able to trace) on 6 February 2010. The Karanlık Konsey consists
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of representatives from all kinds of deep state organisations and foreign powers. Just as
the Tapınakçılar in Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu, it is suggested that the Karanlık Konsey in Tek Türkiye
and later  the Karar  Kurulu in Şefkat  Tepe  have connections with the masonic Knights
Templar. Several Knights Templar symbols are referred to in Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu as well as
in Karar Kurulu and Karanlık Konsey. For instance: 
• The faces of the actors in both the Tapınakçılar and the Karar Kurulu are hidden. In Kurtlar
Vadisi Pusu they wear masks most of the time, in Karar Kurulu their faces are blackened. 
• The actors in Karar Kurulu wear rings that resemble Knight Templar rings. On the rings and
on one of the banners hanging on the wall a kind of Baphomet symbol is depicted. This
symbol had been used in the serial Şubat Soğuğu as well; here (Plate 3 below) it appears on
the ring worn by the leader of the deep state organisation.
 
Plate 3: screenshot ring with Bapomet symbol Karar Kurulu [Decision board], Şefkat Tepe 5,04 min.48
35 In Kurtlar  Vadisi  Pusu,  just  as  in Tek Türkiye,  the references  to  a  masonic-like global,
Christian,  western secret  organisation,  which aims at  toppling the world order using
Turkey as  a  target  that  has  to be won over,  is  connected to the “Sèvres  syndrome”
discussed above. In Tek Türkiye, the scenes of the Karanlık Konsey are related to the main
storyline. Members of the council meet secretly with characters of the serial in southeast
Anatolia. This free masonic organisation is a coalition of all kinds of secret organisations,
foreign such as the CIA, Russian or local such as the deep state. In the story, they are
involved in the struggle in southeast Anatolia. The message conveyed is that the Kurdish
populace is manipulated by these foreign forces, which obstruct a peaceful cohabitation
of Turks and Kurds. In Şefkat Tepe, the same scenes of the Karanlık Konsey in Tek Türkiye are
used with a different voice-over. The scenes do not have any relation with the plot of the
main serial. In contrast with Tek Türkiye, the characters in the main serial are not aware
of the existence of the Karar Kurulu. The scenes of the Karar Kurulu in Şefkat Tepe are only
used to comment on actual political events going on in Turkey at the time; the closure of
the Dershane’s and later on, the 17 December 2013 corruption scandal. 
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Mixture of fiction and reality
36 Samanyolu went even one step farther in mingling facts and fiction. On 9 February 2014
Samanyolu reported the discussion in the Karar Kurulu in their main news bulletin Ana
Haber Bülteni ([Main News Bulletin], 17.30 -21.30 min.). The anchorman remarked that the
episode of Şefkat Tepe, broadcasted on 8 February 2014, had provided the audience again
with scenes full of action. Without referring explicitly to the fact that this was fiction, he
announced that  the Karar  Kurulu met  again.  Then a fragment of  the mini  serial  was
shown, provided with Turkish subtitles. Samanyolu produced this mingling of reality and
fiction on several occasions. On 12 March 2014 the station was admonished by the RTÜK (
Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu/Radio Television Supreme Council) for the same action49. This
time a fragment of the 15 February 2014 Karar Kurulu episode was broadcasted the next
day as a non-fiction item in the lunchtime weekday news program Güncel Durum [Current
Situation]. Since spring 2014 scenes of the Karar Kurulu have no longer appeared in any of
the Samanyolu shows.
37 The AKP government continued their destructive actions against the Gülen Movement.
On 14th of December 2014, instigated by the AKP government, many employees of media
concerns related to the Gülen Movement were arrested, amongst them Hidayet Karaca,
general manager of the Samanyolu Broadcasting Group. At his arrest Karaca declared: “
Bir  dizi  filmden  terör  örgütü  çıkıyor.  Özgür  Türkiye,  özgür  basın  susmaz”  (A  terrorist
organisation originates from a serial. Free Turkey, the free press does not remain silent)50
,  and later he said “Yeni Türkiye dizilerden korkuyor.  Bir yayın grup başkanı  eğer terörden
suçlanıyorsa daha ne diyeyim” (The new Turkey is afraid of serials. What else can I say when
the general manager of a media group is accused of terror) 51. The “New Turkey” refers to
the new era in Turkish political history that Erdoğan claims he is building. 
38 Karaca was accused of “heading a terrorist group” based on references made in a scene of
the Karanlık Konsey in Tek Türkiye in 2009 about an alleged Islamist group the Tahşiyeciler
(Annotators, E64)52. In the serial, the Karanlık Konsey indicates that it could use a group
such as the Tahşiyeciler in order to provoke a reaction from the secularists53. It seems
that Fethullah Gülen, had a theological dispute with the Tahşiyeciler, originally a branch
of  the  Nurcu Movement  from  which  the  Gülen  Movement originated  as  well54.  In  a
television speech on 6 April 2009, where Fethullah Gülen answered questions of followers,
he clarified the meaning of the word irtica (fundamentalism) by explaining where the
term comes from and how it developed in the context of modern Turkish history. In this
speech  he  referred  to  the  Tahşiyeciler  as  an  organisation,  which  could  potentially
radicalise55.  The accusation is  based only  on a  fragment  of  this  speech taken out  of
context; the pro-government media outlet Sabah (Morning) placed this fragment on its
website56. The leader of the Tahşiyeciler, Mehmet Doğan, was arrested and imprisoned for
10 months in 2010. He openly sympathised with Osama Bin Laden and violent struggle;
this  in  opposition  to  Fethullah  Gülen who sought  dialogue57.  In  2013  Karaca  had an
illegally wiretapped telephone conversation with Gülen about the Tahşiyeciler scene in
the script  of  the  serial  in  2009.  The judiciary  suggested that Karaca  and Gülen sent
messages  to  police  officers  through  the  serial  to  make  them  take  action  on  the
Tahşiyeciler58. Although no further evidence has been brought in this case, and several
courts have asked for the release of Karaca pending his trial59, in November 2017 he was
convicted to 31 years of imprisonment60.
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 Ötesiz İnsanlar ([The People Beyond], 2013-2015)
39 Meanwhile,  Samanyolu continued to  criticize  the  AKP government  and especially  its
president Erdoğan. References to a deep state organisation appeared again in the serial
Ötesiz İnsanlar. This serial was broadcasted for two seasons, 2013-2015. It was produced by
Ömer Önder,  the scenario was written by the Kız  Kulesi  Senaryo Grubu (Maiden tower
scenario group). Until the 43rd episode, broadcasted on 24 November 2014, the serial was
directed  by  Başak Soysal.  The  44th episode  does  not  have  credits  and from the  45 th
episode, broadcasted on 8 December 2014, onwards the serial was directed by NEB, the
initials  of  Nursan Esenboğa.  Ötesiz  İnsanlar takes place against  the background of  the
political  situation of  the 28 February 1997 postmodern coup.  This show focuses on a
religious village girl, Elif, who enters the medical faculty of Istanbul University. With the
help of a young lieutenant Deniz, she had been able to escape being married off to the son
of a landowner and arrives in Istanbul. The first season concentrates mainly on the love
affair between Elif and Deniz, son of a secular colonel in the Turkish army. His parents do
not agree with Deniz’ choice for a headscarf-wearing religious girl from a peasant family.
They want Deniz to marry Sanem, the spoiled, unreligious daughter of general Kudret
Karay. 
40 The serial revolves around the headscarf issue and the strong anti-religious atmosphere
in  Turkey,  especially  the  Turkish  army.  Elif  and  her  friends  encounter  all  kinds  of
difficulties when they want to enter university. In order to enrol, they have to remove
their headscarves, later on they are not allowed to attend courses or take exams. Kudret
Karay, one of the cruelest secular orientated generals in the army, tries to purify the
army of all religious elements; religious officers are severely punished. He was so afraid of
religion that he forced his own sister Rana to give up her religious lover İbrahim. When
she gives birth to a girl Karay tells her that the baby died. In reality he gave the girl for
adoption to a family in east Anatolia; this turns out to be Elif. Since Elif is one of the most
prominent, strongminded amongst the headscarved students, she has a lot to do with
Rana, who is vice director of Istanbul University. Only near the end of the serial, Rana,
İbrahim and Elif are reunited. 
41 In the second season, Kudret Karay is approached by a deep state organisation, which
aims at further destabilising Turkey’s political system. Here again, the organisation is
depicted as a free masonic like organisation. Kudret Karay becomes the leader of the
organisation and the ceremony accompanying this event is full of free masonic symbols,
such as, again, the ring with the Baphometh symbol. In order to be inaugurated as the
new leader, Kudret Karay has to take a blood oath with the old leader. Kudret Karay’s first
assignment  is  to  create  more  chaos  and  disruption  through  the  establishment  of  a
popular religious political movement. The deep state organisation notices that the anti-
religious intervention of 28 February 1997 did not stop the religious sentiments of large
segments of the population, especially the conservative migrants from Anatolia. In order
to gain control over these people, the deep state organisation bribes a simple religious
man,  heading  a  charity  organisation,  to  become  the  leader  of  a  political  Islamic
movement. The movement resembles the AKP in its initial phase and its leader is an
Erdoğan look-alike (Plate 4 below). This character is depicted as faking religiosity; he is
corrupt and only after money and power. In this way, Samanyolu again sought a means to
ventilate their political opinion.
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Plate 4: Erdoğan look-alike: Ötesiz İnsanlar final episode 1.26,04 min.
 
Conclusion
42 This article has aimed at elaborating on how Samanyolu disseminated its socio-political
content through its television series and serials; the relation of the themes of these series
to Turkish political and religious reality, how these themes can be discerned, how they
develop  over  time  and  how  they  comply  with  the  religiosity  Samanyolu  wants  to
disseminate? 
43 Samanyolu started, as part  of  a trend in Turkish television,  to include socio-political
content in its series and serials from 2004 onwards. Samanyolu focused on the Kurdish
issue in three of the serials analysed in this article: Şubat Soğuğu, Tek Turkiye and Şefkat
Tepe.  Their line of  approach has a strong nationalistic view of the PKK:  the PKK are
terrorists  and  in  cooperation  with  foreign  forces,  a  threat  to  the  unity  of  Turkey.
However, in line with the teachings of the Gülen Movement, with an emphasis on peace,
dialogue  and education,  the  Kurdish  people  living  in  the  area  suffer  most  from the
violence. Education would help them to have a better future, to develop their society and
the need to join the PKK would disappear.
44 Another recurrent theme is the 28 February 1997 military intervention; the subject of
Şubat  Soğuğu and  Ötesiz  İnsanlar.  These  programmes  problematize  the  anti-Islamic
measures  taken  after  the  military  intervention.  After  2013,  the  AKP  focused  on  the
destruction of the power of their former ally, the Gülen Movement. The Gülen Movement
reacted through its television channel, not only in news programmes but in its series and
serials as well. Probably, they realised that through their very popular shows they could
reach a much wider audience. 
45 Religion and piety occur in the serials discussed, but with the exception of Ötesiz İnsanlar,
the action serials do not display religiosity very openly. Religiosity is referred to by the
fact that the good guys are Muslims, the characters sometimes pray to Allah in difficult
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situations and sometimes a wise pious man helps the characters make difficult decisions.
The main theme of Ötesiz İnsanlar is the military intervention and the headscarf issue. It is
therefore, logical, that a display of religiosity and piety is more foregrounded. In line with
the teachings of the Gülen Movement, emphasis is laid on tolerance of the differences in
human beings, peace and the importance of education.
46 Samanyolu, as other Turkish television channels, integrated contemporary and historical
references to reality. Especially, since the start of the controversy between the AKP and
the  Gülen Movement,  they  took  advantage  of  their  access  to  wide  audiences  to
disseminate, in a highly politicized mediascape, their side of the story. 
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ABSTRACTS
From the early 2000s onwards Turkish television drama has been a vehicle for the dissemination
of political content in Turkey. It occurred in shows of many Turkish television channels. This
article  focuses  on  Samanyolu (1993-2016)  a  generic  channel  aiming  at  an  Islamic  orientated
audience, related to the Gülen Movement. The channel disseminated its socio-political content
through its television series and serials. Samanyolu focused on the Kurdish issue in three of the
serials analysed in this article: Şubat Soğuğu [February Cold], Tek Turkiye [One Turkey] and Şefkat
Tepe [Compassion Peak]. Their line of approach has a strong nationalistic view of the PKK: the PKK
are terrorists and in cooperation with foreign forces, a threat for the unity of Turkey. However,
in line with the teachings of the Gülen Movement,  with an emphasis on peace,  dialogue and
education, the Kurdish people living in the area suffer most from the violence. Education would
help them to have a better future, to develop their society and the need to join the PKK would
disappear. Another recurrent theme is the 28 February 1997 military intervention; the subject of
Şubat Soğuğu and Ötesiz İnsanlar [The People Beyond].  These programmes problematize the anti-
Islamic  measures  taken  after  the  military  intervention.  After  2013,  the  AKP  focused  on  the
destruction of the power of their former ally, the Gülen Movement. The Gülen Movement reacted
through its television channel, not only in news programmes but in its series and serials as well.
Depuis le début des années 2000, les fictions télévisuelles ont véhiculé des messages politiques,
dans  plusieurs  chaînes  de  télévision.  Cet  article  étudie  la  chaîne  Samanyolu (1993-2016),  une
chaîne de télévision générique qui  vise  un public  à  sensibilité  islamique,  liée au mouvement
Gülen.  La  chaîne a  diffusé  ses  contenus socio-politiques  à  travers  ses  séries  télévisées  et  ses
feuilletons. Samanyolu a traité de la question kurde dans trois des feuilletons analysés dans cet
article : Şubat Soğuğu [Le Froid de février], Tek Turkiye [Seule la Turquie] et Şefkat Tepe [La Colline de la
compassion].  Leur approche donne une vision très nationaliste du PKK (le groupe armé kurde,
ndlt) : ce sont des terroristes, en lien avec des puissances étrangères, qui forment une menace
pour l’unité de la Turquie. Cependant, en accord avec les enseignements du mouvement Gülen,
qui  prône  la  paix,  le  dialogue  et  l’éducation,  la  population  kurde  est  présentée  comme  la
principale  victime  de  la  violence.  L’éducation  les  aiderait  à  avoir  un  avenir  meilleur,  à  se
développer, ce qui tarirait le recrutement du PKK. Un autre thème récurrent est l’intervention
militaire du 28 février 1997, ce qui est le sujet de Şubat Soğuğu, et de Ötesiz İnsanlar [Les Gens de
l’au-delà]. Ces  programmes  traitent des  réformes  contre  l’islam  qui  ont  été  prises  après
l’intervention militaire. Après 2013, l’AKP s’est donné pour objectif de détruire le pouvoir de son
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ancien allié,  le  mouvement Gülen.  Le mouvement Gülen a réagi  au moyen de ses chaînes de
télévision, pas seulement via les nouvelles, mais aussi dans ses séries et feuilletons. 
INDEX
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